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Conundrum or Complication: A Study of Yield Curve 








The definition of the decline of long term yields in the light of increasing 
short term yields as a conundrum by Chairman Greenspan in February 
2005 has generated a significant amount of research. This paper presents 
a study of yield curve dynamics over this period using economic surprise 
data as the diagnostic tool. Results are presented for both US and 
Japanese data which indicate a non-linear response of the yield curve to 
economic data and monetary policy over the period in question. Further, 
a limited model is presented that is consistent with the observations. This 
can lead to an explanation of the conundrum in terms of a non-linear 
yield response to expected long term inflation and a variable expected 
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  The exercise of monetary policy is fraught with the perils of unintended 
consequences to deliberate movements in the limited number of policy instruments 
available to central bankers. As such considerable effort has been made in developing 
models, both heuristic and fundamental, to aid monetary policy setting institutions in 
making decisions. The heuristic models derive primarily from the work of Taylor 
(Taylor 1993) where relationships were posited relating to the appropriate level of 
short rates in a changing measured inflation and output environment. On the more 
fundamental economic front a considerable theoretical advance was made with the 
introduction of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (Clarida, Gali et al. 1999). This has 
led to the development of a class of yield curve models where the evolution of the 
yield curves may be related to the evolution of a number of economic variables in an 
arbitrage free manner (Ang and Piazzesi 2003). The use of these approaches, either 
separately or in combination have given policy setters are much greater insight into 
the mechanics of the evolution of the yield curve, and as such allowed them greater 
confidence in their predictions of the consequences of their actions (Gallmeyer, 
Hollifield et al. 2005).  
  During the latter stages of Chairman Greenspan’s tenure as head of the Federal 
Open Market Committee however a situation arose where the response of the yield 
curve to a sharp reduction, and later increase, of the short rate was completely at 
variance to the predictions of most classes of models. In this case in the period 2002 – 
2004 as the short rate was lowered to a historical level of 1%, the long end of the term 
structure actually rose in yield, Figure 1. In general, yield curve models would predict 
that falling short rates would lead to a lowering of the long end although there was 
rarely agreement between models on the actual degree of yield reductions. This 
abnormal behaviour of the long end of the yield curve was memorably described by 
Chairman Greenspan as a “conundrum” (Greenspan 2005). However the relevance of 
such unanticipated movement is greater than that of a mere puzzle. The principal 
purpose of central bank easing is to increase liquidity in the financial system and, by 
taking real rates effectively negative, to prompt an economic recovery in the overall 
economy. If at the same time borrowing costs over the long term are effectively 
rising, as was observed in this time, the impact of a key weapon of a central bank in avoiding recessionary trends is to some extent being mitigated. Similarly, short rates 
are raised in order to reduce liquidity in the greater economy. If at the same time, long 
maturity yields are dropping, making it cheaper to borrow for term, then the total 
impact of the tightening is to some extent compromised. Thus, it is of interest to 
understand the reaction of the yield curve in this environment so as to greater 
determine the impact and effectiveness of monetary policy going forward (McGough, 
Rudebusch et al. 2005).   
  In addition there was the heuristic observation that the yield curve tended to 
predict, with varying degrees of accuracy, a number of economic variables (Estrella 
2005). These observations were not consistent with the relevant market data over the 
period in question. 
 
Figure 1: Greenspan’s Conundrum - After mid 2002 reducing short term rates were accompanied by an 
increase in long term yields. The increase in short term rates from June 2004 was then accompanied by 
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  Since the naming of Greenspan’s conundrum, work has been carried out to 
attempt to understand the dynamics that were relevant at the time. Rudebusch 
(Rudebusch 2006) carried out a detailed study to investigate the conundrum in terms 
of a number of joint yield curve / macroeconomic models. There were two main 
conclusions from this study. Firstly, it was shown that bond purchases/sales at the 
long end of the curve had no discernable effect on abnormal movements of long 
yields. This is an important result as previously there had been a general assumption 
that the impact of foreign investors was a significant determinant of long end yields 
over the relevant period. The second, more disquieting result was that the current 
generation of yield curve models could not adequately explain the observed behaviour. A more recent paper has attempted to explain the conundrum in terms of 
Goodhart’s Law (Thornton 2007) - a financial version of the Heisenberg uncertainty 
principle, however if this were true in practice, it would leave the science of monetary 
policy as described in Clarida et al in very poor shape (Rudebusch 1995). 
  
  In this paper it is proposed to study Greenspan’s conundrum using the 
economic surprise data approach first used to study the behaviour of fixed income 
instruments directly after the release of economic data (Ederington and Lee 1993) 
(Green 2004). In these and later studies, the degree of surprise was identified by the 
difference between the realised economic data and that predicted by a panel of 
economists. This original studies showed that the bond market reacted in a 
statistically significant manner consistent with the level of surprise across a wide 
range of economic data. The application of surprise data was greatly enhanced by the 
work of Gürkaynak et al (Gürkaynak 2005) where a macroeconomic approach to the 
evolution of the yield curve was considered in the light of the surprise data. This 
compared the observed behaviour of the yield curve to the predictions of a number of 
NKPC models. Whilst agreement was found in some cases, the response of the yield 
curve to inflation data such as the consumer price index (CPI) and the consumer price 
index less food and energy (CPI-x), was of less statistical significance, and to a lower 
magnitude that that expected by theory.   This inadequate response to inflation data 
led the authors to posit the existence of a variable long term market expectation of 
inflation which went to some extent to explain the observed results. However with 
reference to the FOMC’s stated policy of basing policy decisions based broadly, but 
not exclusively, on realised and expectations of CPI-x and non-farm payroll data 
remains an enigma within a conundrum. (The pronouncements of a number of FOMC 
members outlining policy may be on the Federal Reserve website). 
  Thus even without the naming the observed phenomenon as a conundrum it is 
clear that there is some inadequacy in current understanding of the evolution of yield 
curves to realised inflation within a macroeconomic framework. In this paper the 
evolution of the yield curve in the period 2000 – 2007 will be studied. As noted 
earlier, over this period short term rates experienced an unprecedented range of vales 
starting at over 6% in 2000, dropping to 1% in 2002 and then rising to almost 5% by 
the end of 2006. In such circumstances, it may well be questioned whether results and 
deductions obtained from extreme data may be applicable to general monetary policy. However, in the current environment (February 2008) where monetary policy has 
been loosened considerably due to adverse economic conditions, at the same time as 
inflationary conditions not necessarily being benign, the study may still have 
relevance. 
  The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a description of the data 
and the relatively simple analysis methods used in its study. Section 3 gives the 
results as derived primarily to US data. A limited amount of data from the Japanese 
market is also presented. Whilst not comparable in quality to the US data, it was the 
only major market, ex the US, that exhibited significant inflationary issues over the 
period in question. Section 4 presents a discussion of the results and outlines a 
macroeconomic treatment that may be used to explain the observed results. Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Data and Analysis 
 
  The economic surprise data is collected by Bloomberg and MMS. For most 
developed economies, which include for the purpose of this study the United States 
and Japan, the announcement date for economic data is well known in advance. As 
such, the data collectors assemble the predictions of a large number of economists, 
from investment banks and research institutes. These predictions are available on the 
day of the announcement and the magnitude of the surprise is defined as the 
difference between the median prediction and the realised data. There is an 
assumption here that the market makers and other market participants responsible for 
setting prices effectively agree with the predictions of the “median economist”. 
Previously reported results indicate that this is a reasonable assumption. In the 
literature the surprise factor is usually normalised by the volatility of the surprise, 
determined over the whole dataset, however as this study will concentrate almost 
exclusively on CPI-x data, this is not carried out here. Within this study only two 
types of economic data will be considered: US capacity utilisation and US and 
Japanese inflation. The capacity utilisation data is collected by the US Federal 
Reserve and is released in the middle of each calendar month. From a macro-
economic point of view capacity utilisation is closely related to the concept of output 
gap (Lars Ljungqvist 2004). The inflation indices CPI-x (USD) and TCPI-x (JPY) are measures of inflation where the highly variable food and energy components have 
been removed from the basket used in the computation of the index. The actual data 
used are the monthly returns on the index, as the index for the US date generally 
increases across the sample time window. The data is collected by the US Bureau of 
Labour Statistics and, along with the GDP deflator is the principal measure of short 
term price inflation in the United States. The Japanese inflation data is collected by 
the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. The “T” 
prefix indicated that the data used is for the Tokyo region. This data is calculated and 
released before that for the rest of the country and as such is more relevant as surprise 
data.  
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  The yield curve data used in this study are short term interbank offered   
interest rates (Libor) provided by the British Bankers Association (BBA). This data is 
freely available on the web. The long dated yield curve information is interest swap 
data collected by the International Swap Dealers Association (ISDA). This data was 
freely available on the web until February 2007 and is now available on Reuters. The 
data is collected on a daily basis. The reason this data has been used is that it depends 
on polling data. That is, on any day in question, the data collectors poll a range of 
actual trading firms at a specified time, to get a range of quotes on the interest rates in 
question. The highest and lowest quotes are discarded and the recorded quote is the 
average of the residual quotes. On days that an insufficient number of quotes are received by the data collector, normally 5, no value is recorded. This data has a 
significant disadvantage that data is not therefore available on every trading day. It 
has the significant advantage however that for every that there is a data point, this is a 
data point that is consistent with the majority view of the major market participants, at 
that time, on that day. As confirmation of this hypothesis, both the BBA data and the 
ISDA data are use to cash settle caps/floors and swap options respectively on the 
appropriate days. Thus it is in the financial interest of all market participants to ensure 
that the rates that are recorded are the right ones. Swap data has been usefully applied 
in previous studies of the evolution of the yield curve (Piazzesi 2005). 
  For the long dated interest rate data, it is not clear from previous studies over 
whether it is appropriate to use the basic par swap yield curve data or forward rate 
data based on zero coupon bond rates derived from the par interest rate data. Either 
price data or market yield data has been used in a number of studies.  However in 
Gürkaynak 2005, 1yr forward rates were used. The use of forward rate data is 
predicated on the expectations hypothesis (James 2004) which deems that the forward 
rate is effectively isolated from short rate concerns (Carriero, Favero et al. 2006). 
Irrespective of beliefs or otherwise on the expectation hypothesis, within this study no 
preference is taken. Results are presented for both the responses of par swap rates of 
maturity: 1yr, 5yr, 10yr and 30yr and for forward swap rate maturities of: 1yr, 1yr 
forward, 3yr, 2yr forward, 5yr, 5yr forward and 20yr, 10yrs forward. For the Japanese 
data only 10yr par swap rate data is presented.  
 
  In order to analyse the response of the different parts of the yield curve to 
surprises in the economic data, robust regression techniques are used (Sheather 1990). 
Whilst the use of robust regression is implicit in the use of Huber-White statistics in 
Green 2004, its application does not appear to be widespread in the analysis of 
surprise data. Given the volatility of financial markets and the number of influences to 
which individual instruments are subject, it would be surprising if the only influence 
on a given day was that of a given economic data release. Further, it would be very 
surprising if the release of the economic data dominated all other information on that 
day for all the datapoints under consideration. An example is the activity of the 
financial markets after the tragic events of 9/11, where daily changes bore little 
impact of released economic data.    The use of robust analysis techniques allows for the possibility that not all data 
within the sample acts according to a given relationship, and allows the user to 
negatively weight, in a statistically consistent manner, those datapoints that are not 
consistent with the overall relationship that may exist in the data. This does of course 
necessitate the use of Huber-White statistics to increase the relevant standard errors to 
compensate for the fact of the negative weighting of some of the datapoints. In 
addition to the standard regression estimation statistics such as standard error and r
2, 
Bayesian Information Criteria (Schwarz 1978) will be used to assess the validity of 





  The results presented in this section illustrate what may be considered to be an 
unusual period in the evolution of the US yield curve however in a number of ways 
ways it reacted exactly in accordance with theoretical expectations and previously 
reported data. The long term drift (month to month) of the slope of the yield curve 
displays a high degree of correlation with the realised level of Capacity Utilisation, 
figure 3. If the capacity utilisation is used as a proxy for output gap, this result is 
completely in agreement with the predictions of NPKC theory. 
 
Figure 3: The evolution of the spread between 1yr and 10yr swap yields and Capacity Utilisation. The 
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However using the same sample, the daily response of the yield curve to surprises in 
Capacity Utilisations show no statistically significant relationship. This is not in agreement with results present in Gürkaynak et al using forward curves derived from 
a fitted treasury curve. 
 
When the CPI-X data is considered however, the response of the yield curve data to 
surprise information of inflation is somewhat consistent with that reported in 
previously mentioned studies, table 1. Whilst there is a statistically significant 
response, it appears to be inconsistent with the weight that the FOMC placed on the 
statistic. 
 
Table 1: Linear regression responses of swap rates and derived forward rates to surprise CPI-x news 
 
 Datapoints  Co-Efficient  Correlation  r
2 BIC 
1yr  70  0.074*  5.91%  -199.15 / -194.92 
5yr  70  0.119*  5.28%  -145.31 / -141.22 
10yr  70  0.103  3.24%  -114.96 / -108.77 
30yr  69  0.083  2.35%  -118.67 / -111.84 
      
1yr, 1yr Fwd  70  0.223**  11.8%  -90.62 / -90.92* 
3yr, 2yr Fwd  71  0.142*  5.58%  -104.54 / -100.10 
5yr, 5yr Fwd  73  0.193**  6.84%  -70.44 / -67.03 
20yr, 10yr Fwd  71  0.0852  2.28%  -109.56 / -102.67 
 
Note: For the Huber-White standard errors, *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% 
level and * at the 10% level. The Bayesian information criterion (BIC) indicates significance with a 
function that attempts to minimise the number of parameters. * indicates that the BIC of the regression 
is less than that of the data on its own. The regressions include constant parameters that are not shown. 
 
  From figure 1, it is clear that there is a definite response to declining inflation 
as the FOMC was observed to aggressively cut short term rates in order to loosen 
monetary policy. However this heuristic argument is not directly observed in the data. 
The solution is to attempt to understand the response of the long end of the yield 
curve, to changes in realised inflation, in terms of a currently “unobserved variable”. 
The further part of the analysis is an attempt to determine that “unobserved variable” 
and further to determine if the variable is in fact observable. 
   There are a number of ways in which to attempt to determine the nature of the 
unobserved variable. Firstly there is the large vector autoregression approach 
advocated in the pioneering work of Campbell and Shiller (Campbell and Shiller 
1987). However in this study, significant weight has been placed on ensuring that the 
data used in the analysis are synchronous. As this will not be the case if multiple 
economic data streams are used, this approach will not be used here. However it is 
possible to investigate multiple linear regressions, using the economic data as lagged 
regressors. However for a number of economic data time series (CPI, CPI-x, PPI, PPI-
x, Non farm payrolls, Capacity Utilisation, Retail Sales, and the ISM survey data),  no 
significant impact on the response of the long end of the yield curve to inflation 
surprise data was found. 
  Similarly, the impact of the evolution of different maturity yields was studied, 
however for these cases there was no significant impact on the inflation response. 
  As a result of the effective failure of linear methodologies to accurately 
explain the data,  the use of a non-linear response was investigated. This is motivated 
by the observation, that over the period in question, the yield curve went through 
unprecedented changes and as such, the level of interest rates may have a significant 
impact on the response of the yield curve. In this case an externally excited threshold 
regression model (Tong 1990) was used where the response of the yield to surprise 
data was predicated on the level of a different interest rate. Whilst statistically 
significant results were found for a number of different external rates, the highest 
level of confidence is found when using the 1yr rate as the parameter that controls the 
threshold response, table 2. As can be seen from table 2, over the period in question 
the level of the 1yr interest rate had a significant impact on the response of long term 
interest rates to surprise inflation data. This is at the expense of the number of data 
points in each sample. However the results are quite clear. For 1yr interest rates above 
3% there is a very significant positive response of the long term data to surprises in 
CPI-X. This is what would be expected. However when a study of the response of 
logterm yields to inflation surprises was made with 1 year rates below 2% the data 
indicates that there is again a statistically significant response to the inflation data, 
however it has reversed sign, table 3. 
  
 Table 2: Responses of swap rates and derived forward rates to surprise CPI-X news when the 1yr swap 
rate > 3% 
 Datapoints  Co-Efficient  Correlation  r
2 BIC 
1yr  39  0.126*  9.19%  -133.85 / -129.64 
5yr  40  0.155**  12.3%  -107.24 / -105.09 
10yr  40  0.152**  9.25%  -97.61 / -94.12 
30yr  35  0.223***  18.4%  -88.02 / -88.02* 
      
1yr, 1yr Fwd  40  0.176*  11.4%  -93.89 / -91.34 
3yr, 2yr Fwd  41  0.211**  14.6%  -90.68 / -89.75 
5yr, 5yr Fwd  38  0.177  9.69%  -83.04 / -79.63 
20yr, 10yr Fwd  36  0.187  11.2%  -84.31 / -81.42 
 
In other words the +0.223 bp move in 30 year interest rates for every 1bp surprise in 
inflation, has change to a -0.237bp move in 30 year interest rates. This is, for low 
short term interest rates, the response to a surprise increase in measured inflation, is 
that long term interest rates decline. This is completely at odds with current models 
and indeed any intuitive thought about the evolution of interest rates.  
 
Table 3: Responses of swap rates and derived forward rates to surprise CPI-X news when the 1yr swap 
rate < 2% 
 Datapoints  Co-Efficient  Correlation  r
2 BIC 
1yr  17  0.016  0.7%  -80.64 / -75.1 
5yr  16  -0.158  5.2%  -40.63 / -35.93 
10yr  17  -0.266*  12.6%  -38.66 / -35.29 
30yr  17  -0.237**  14.8%  -45.38 / -42.44 
      
1yr, 1yr Fwd  17  -0.051  0.0046  -37.71 / -32.12 
3yr, 2yr Fwd  17  -0.115  0.01871  -33.86 / -28.51 
5yr, 5yr Fwd  18  -0.172  0.03802  -32.21 / -27.13 
20yr, 10yr Fwd  18  -0.138  0.06386  -46.98 / -42.39 
 
  There is a further observation that the response of par rates displays a far 
greater level of statistical significance to that observed using forward rates. Studies 
were carried out to investigate if there were instrument sensitivity relationships such 
as duration or DV01 (Dollar Value of 1 basis point) that may explain the difference 
however no statistically significant relationship was found. Further work needs to be carried out to investigate the obviously related evolution of par and forward rates 
around the release of surprise data. 
  A similar study may be carried out with Japanese data. Over the period in 
question, the Bank of Japan was generally in a Zero Interest Rate Period (ZIRP) 
where short term rates were kept at effectively zero percent. As such short term 
interest rates showed almost no variability across the whole sample window, Figure 4  
 
Figure 4: The evolution of the JPY 1mo Libor short term rate and the 10yr swap rate over the Zero 
Interest Rate Policy (ZIRP) period. It should be noted that over this period the exclusively Japanese 
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As a result using a 1yr rate, as was the case for the US data gave no significant results. 
For the JPY data the highest level of confidence was found using the 5yr swap rate as 
the external threshold parameter.  
 
Table 4: Responses of JPY 10yr swap rates to surprise TCPI-x data using the 5yr swap rate as a 
threshold parameter  
 Datapoints  Co-Efficient  Correlation  r
2 BIC 
10yr, no threshold  45  0.022  1.32%  -179.24 / -172.23 
       
10yr, 5yr > 0.70%  18  0.304**  40.17%  -68.02 / -71.49* 
       
10yr, 5yr < 0.7%  24  -0.007  0.39%  -137.14 / -130.88 
 
    The results of the study are presented in Table 4. As can be seen there 
is statistically significant evidence of threshold behaviour for 5yr rates in excess of 
0.7%, however the below threshold behaviour, observed in the US data is not replicated. In addition, the JPY data suffers from a paucity of data points which may 
compromise the value of the statistical relationships observed.  
  As well as looking for the threshold relationship in the surprise data, direct 
relationships may also exist in the response of the yield curve to changes in 
expectations of economic variable on a month to month basis. Results based on the 
monthly change of interest rate versus the difference between the realised data and the 
economists’ expectation of that data, one month later are presented in Tables 5 and 6. 
In this case the threshold value of the 1yr rate was 2.45%. As can be seen from the 
data, the results for the longer term changes are both statistically significant and are 
consistent with those found for the one day surprise data. That is, for short term 
interest rates below a threshold level, the sign of the response of long term yields to 
the inflation data, changes sign. 
  Whilst the confidence in the response function in terms of the monthly data is 
not as strong as that for the daily surprise data, what is significant here is that the 
direction and magnitude of the results are consistent.  
 
Table 5: Responses of swap rates and derived forward rates to month to month evolution of CPI-x with 
1 yr rates > 2.45% 
 Datapoints  Co-Efficient  Correlation  r
2 BIC 
1yr 44  0.568  4.88%  34.53    /39.90 
5yr 44  0.660*  6.38%  37.06  /  41.73 
10yr 43  0.651**  7.17%  27.17  /  31.50 
30yr 42  0.699***  15.96%  10.57  /  10.74 
      
1yr, 1yr Fwd  45  1.006**  8.60%  56.90 / 60.47 
3yr, 2yr Fwd  45  0.546*  3.92%  45.5 / 51.31 
5yr, 5yr Fwd  45  0.624**  6.59%  35.13 / 39.68 
20yr, 10yr Fwd  42  0.549**  7.89%  14.24 / 18.27 
 
In addition the external threshold rates are consistent. As such it is clear from the data 
that the yield curve, at the time identified by Chairman Greenspan, was evolving over 
both short term (daily) and the longer term (monthly) in a fashion that was not in 
agreement with current yield curve models 
 
 Table 6: Responses of swap rates and derived forward rates to month to month evolution of CPI-x with 
1 yr rates < 2.45% 
 Datapoints  Co-Efficient  Correlation  r
2 BIC 
1yr  24 -0.221  2.58%  -19.55/-13.82 
5yr  23  -0.884*  11.53%  4.26 / 7.72 
10yr  23  -0.940*  12.90%  4.47 / 7.56 
30yr  24  -1.186**  28.29%  4.18 / 2.55* 
      
1yr, 1yr Fwd  26 -0.858*  10.72%  15.27  /  18.84 
3yr, 2yr Fwd  24 -1.125*  11.55%  16.41  /  19.83 
5yr, 5yr Fwd  26 -1.51**  20.84%  25.72  /  26.16 





  The results indicate that at low levels of short term rates, the response of the 
long end of the yield to changes in inflation reverses sign. As a matter of historical 
record, it was during the period of low short term rates that Chairman Greenspan 
experienced his conundrum in the evolution of long term interest rates. Thus whilst it 
is not clear whether the observed behaviour was purely responsible, explaining the 
non-linear response is undoubtedly part of the solution to the problem. Similar to the 
approach taken in Gürkaynak et al, an attempt here is made to sketch a possible 
explanation whose main qualification is that it fits the observations and is, to some 
extend, consistent with current macroeconomic yield curve models. 
 
  The observation that the response of the long end of the yield curve seems to 
depend on a critical level in the short term rate is difficult to reconcile with any 
reasonable model of the evolution of the yield curve. There have been a number of 
models where non-linear effects were built into the yield curve, (Pfann, Schotman et 
al. 1996) however little work has been carried out that would predict threshold effects 
in such a macro manner. In addition, the “special” threshold level of ~ 2.50% for US 
data seems also difficult to reconcile with current models given that little attention is 
given in those models to specific interest rate levels.    A point that was made earlier however is that it there may be an unobserved 
variable that is causing the threshold effects. The observation that the highest 
statistical significance is seen using the 1yr rate, does not of itself mean that the 1yr 
rate is the unobserved variable, merely that its dynamics must closely match that of 
the true unobserved variable. With this in mind it is worth looking at the Fisher 
equation (Fisher 1907), where the level of nominal interest rates of maturity t – yt are 
defined in terms of inflation - πt and real rates  - rt. 
 
yt = πt + rt 
 
Using this equation it is possible to define an expected 1yr real rate as the difference 
between the 1yr interest rate and the annualised inflation rate as measured by CPI-x. 
In figure 5 a quarterly average of the expected 1yr real rate and the 1yr interest rate is 
shown 
 
Figure 5: The evolution of the one year interest rate, the quarterly averaged expected 1yr real rate and 
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As can be seen from figure 5, the level at which the 1yr rate crosses the threshold both 
decreasing and increasing, is quite synchronous with the movement of real rates from 
positive to negative. In other words the time period where the inflation response of the 
yield curve reverses may be associated with a period where there was an expectation 
of negative real rates over a considerable time horizon, 1 year. The use of the 1yr rate, 
as opposed to a shorter maturity interest rate, is important here because of the role of the expectations of short rates in its construction. A reason why no real statistically 
significant threshold was found using the directly determined real rates is that it uses 
the realised inflation as the expectation of inflation. In the threshold period under 
study there are a number of times when the measured real rates were positive, 
however the expectation of real rates would have been negative. As such, doing a 
regression using such volatile and possibly misrepresenting data, even a robust one 
would not be able to identify a statistically significant relationship.  
  Even if it were accepted that the expected real rate is the appropriate missing 
variable, some work still has to be carried out to explain the reversal of the sign of the 
response to inflation news. To quote from Gürkaynak et al, “It is hard to see why 
financial markets would modify their estimate of r* (long term expectation of real 
rates) in response to monetary policy surprises”. However it is the purpose of this 
section to propose that that is exactly what happened in practice under the particular 
environment that persisted at the time under study. For positive real and expected real 
rates, the results that are shown here are in agreement with previously reported data 
and it is plausible to say that the sensitivity to measured inflation is primarily the 
result of changes in the markets perception of the steady state level of inflation – π*.  
  However for the situation when the real rates and, more importantly, their 
expectations are negative it is clear that a different effect is taking place. It is 
proposed that the response of the yield curve to inflation news is constrained by the 
expectation of real rates. Firstly it is proposed that the there is a lower critical level,  
π
c
 , of inflation built into the yield curve below which the market will not take long 
term yields. In other words even if short term inflation is low, even negative, and long 
term expectations are less than πc , the long term inflation expectation that would be 
extracted from the yield curve would still be πc .  
  It is accepted that this assumption is not consistent with a large number of 
studies carried out essentially using the Campbell and Shiller methodology (Campbell 
and Shiller 1991) etc. However for the extended periods of time that these studies 
covered, the inflation rate was either quasi-normal (which I will define as being in a 
range acceptable to the precepts of the Federal Reserve) or excessive. For only very 
short periods of time, if at all, were inflationary conditions considered to be heading 
in the direction of disinflation. Thus the impact of the dynamics of a possible 
disinflationary period will have a negligible impact on the results of these studies. It must be stressed that it is an a priori assumption that part of the reason that the market 
dynamics were unusual over this period was because the economic and policy 
environment was itself unusual. 
  It is further proposed that the yield curve response critical inflation level (πc) 
is reached when expectations of real yields turn from positive to negative. One further 
assumption is needed to explain the observed results and that is that over the period in 
question the market did not expect any significant changes of short term rates due to 
short term movements in the measured rate of inflation. It is clear that over most of 
the period covered by the threshold level Fed Fund rates had been cut to 1% as a 
precautionary defence against possible deflation. In this environment however the 
Fisher equation still held. Thus a change in inflation, could not lead to a change in 
nominal rates and therefore had to be balanced by a change in real rates, but with the 
opposite sign. Given that the long term inflation expectation built into the yield curve, 
would not change long term yields as it was below the critical level, the change in the 
expectation of real rates would lead to a change in the level of long term nominal rates 
but in a direction opposite to that expected from a simple examination of the Fisher 
equation.  
 
  Over the long term the Fisher Equation is altered to be 
 
y* = r* + (π* | E(rt > 0), π
c ) 
 
however in the shorter term it still holds as  
 
yt = πt + rt 
 
and changes will be: 
 
δ(yt) = δ(πt) + δ( rt) = 0 
 
δ(πt) = - δ( rt) 
 
 And the changes in long term rates will be: 
 
y* + δ(y*) = r* -  α.δ(πt) + π
c  
 
where α is the change in long term expectations of real rates as a result of a change in 
short term expectations. It is accepted that the current explanation is somewhat 
convoluted however it provides a ready explanation as to why long term expectations 
of the real rates move. It is because they are the only variable left in what is, in effect 
an accounting relationship. The direction of the move, whilst unexpected, is consistent 
with the conditions that were necessary to create it. 
 
  In the light of the results presents and the discussion, the conundrum can be 
partially understood in terms of a non-linear response of the yield curve to changing 
monetary and economic conditions. Once economic and monetary conditions were 
thought to be a quasi-emergency condition, the response of long term yields no longer 
acted as would be expected from a linear perspective. Declining inflation, and 
negative inflation surprises may have led to a decline in long term inflation 
expectations, these were not reflected in long term rates. Rather the relative increase 
in (already negative) short term real rates resulted in an increase in long term real rate 
expectations, that manifested itself in an effective increase in long term yields. Once 
monetary policy was “normalised” and short term interest rates started to rise, the 
long term rates declined slowly as the excess long term expectations of real rates were 
effectively removed from the determination of long term yields. This was observed as 
a decline in long term yields even as both short term yields and short term inflation 





  Results have been presented that indicate that there is a degree of non-linearity 
in the response of yield curves to changing monetary and/or economic conditions. A 
working hypothesis of the behaviour of the yield curve has been outlined which seeks 
to describe the market behaviour known as Greenspan’s Conundrum. A key component of this hypothesis is the conclusion that the dynamics of the yield curve 
are, under certain circumstances, a function of the markets confidence in the actions 
of the policy makers as well as expectations in the future values of relevant economic 
data. Future work, to be presented in a later paper will be to look at the response of 
different currency yield curve to economic surprise data in the light of the utility 
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